I. INTRODUCTION

MARKET imperfections of various types can create incentives for firms to integrate vertically. Theoretical studies have shown that integration may be induced by transactions costs, imperfect competition, imperfect information and other factors.' Empirical studies have focused primarily on transactions cost motives for integration and have typically found strong support for the transactions cost theory.
Empirical researchers have seldom considered the incentives for integration arising from demand variability-the common notion that firms integrate backward to assure stable sources of supply. This paper assesses demand variability and transactions costs as factors jointly affecting the likelihood of backward integration. A logit analysis of backward integration is performed using data on producers of 34 organic chemical products. The results confirm that transactions costs and demand variability have both been important determinants of integration in the chemicals manufacturing sector.
Unlike many prior studies that have relied on crude proxies for the presence of integration, this study incorporates direct observations of backward integration at the level of individual plants and firms. Moreover, the sample includes detailed information on cost structures and historical demand conditions, which theory suggests should influence firms' integration decisions. The chemicals manufacturing sector offers an attractive context for studying demand variability as a determinant of integration, given the availability of data on the annual production of numerous upstream and downstream products.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the transactions cost and demand variability theories, which are used to derive a 452 MARVIN B. LIEBERMAN series of testable hypotheses. Section III describes the data and measures. In Section IV, logit analysis is used to assess the probability of integration as a function of sunk costs, market concentration and demand variability. Section V offers a summary of findings and some brief conclusions.
II. MODELS AND HYPOTHESES
11(i). Transactions cost models
In the transactions cost theories of Williamson [1975 Williamson [ , 1986 and Klein, Crawford and Alchian [1978] , incentives for vertical integration stem from problems of small numbers bargaining. Such problems can arise given either: (1) small numbers of firms in the market, ex ante; or (2) sunk investments which create lock-in between buyer and seller, ex post. In the latter case, each party to the transaction has the potential to expropriate quasi-rents derived from the other firm's investments. In effect, the parties become locked into a bilateral monopoly relationship based on the extent of "asset specificity." If allowances for future contingencies can be adequately specified, long-term contracts can be written to avoid potential hold-up problems. Otherwise, firms must resort to integration. This paper tests three hypotheses pertaining to the likelihood of backward integration, as implied by the transactions cost theory. The predicted effect of (ex ante) seller concentration can be formalized as: A critical assumption of Carlton's model is that prices are imperfectly flexible; upstream prices must be set before downstream demand is revealed.3 Input prices exceed marginal cost under most demand conditions, given the requirement that independent input suppliers must recover their capacity costs. In effect, downstream firms pay a premium to independent upstream suppliers to compensate for the costs of maintaining buffer capacity.
Carlton shows that under certain conditions, downstream firms will integrate backward for at least some portion of their input requirements. One interesting equilibrium is that of partial integration: firms integrate backward "to satisfy their 'high probability' demand and use the (input) market to satisfy their 'low probability' demand" (Carlton [1979, p. 198] In particular, this will occur when the input has multiple uses, some of which experience large fluctuations in demand. A second implication, based on the law of large numbers, is that "firms are less likely to integrate when they form a small part of total demand for the input, since they would lose the risk pooling economies of large markets as they integrate". This prediction can be formalized as the following hypothesis:
A firm that accounts for a large fraction of total demand for the input is more likely to integrate.
Other models of vertical integration in environments with demand or supply variability offer different predictions. Perry [1984] This hypothesis is tested below using a measure of downstream output variability. Such relations between demand variability and vertical integration have been considered in very few empirical studies. Hypotheses (H4) and (H5) have not, in general, been tested. Caves and Bradburd [1988] found more integration when sales were highly correlated between the upstream and downstream stages, which is inconsistent with hypothesis (H6). However, they judged that the observed association was not causal. Based on an assessment of case studies, Harrigan [1983] concluded that firms in 'volatile' industries avoid vertical integration, which is consistent with hypothesis (H7). Walker and Weber [1987] found that high uncertainty with respect to volume contributed to backward integration when the number of potential suppliers was small, but not when the number was large. This can be viewed as consistent with hypothesis (H7) and to some extent (H5) (integration being less likely when the firm constitutes only a small proportion of total demand for the input).7
III. DATA AND VARIABLES
The data sample covers US producers of the 34 chemical products in Table 1 . These products were selected from the larger universe of organic chemicals, based on data availability and other criteria.8 For each product, Table I lists the primary upstream chemical input, the number of producers at each stage, and the incidence of backward integration at the end of 1980.
Markets in the sample were typically characterized by oligopoly. All products had at least three producers; some upstream inputs, such as benzene, 6Such incentives can also arise in the Carlton model. If downstream producers face independent demand fluctuations, then greater variability can increase the risk-pooling benefits of using the input market (i.e. remaining unintegrated). 7 Although not relevant to the specific hypotheses tested in this paper, several empirical studies suggest that integration often reduces systematic risk. Helfat and Teece [1987] and Spiller [1985] found declines in firms' systematic risk following vertical mergers; Greening [1976] and Mitchell [1976] found that integration reduced firms' cost of capital.
'The sample includes all organic chemicals that met the following criteria: (1) The chemical was not manufactured primarily as a by-product; (2) Data on components of production cost were published in the 1976 SRI Process Economics Program Yearbook; (3) Producer capacities for the product and the main upstream input were listed in the 1981 SRI Directory of Chemical Producers; (4) Annual data on industry output of the product and its main upstream input over the 1970-80 period were published in Synthetic Organic Chemicals; (5) Virtually all producers used similar production processes and the same primary input. (A small number of producers using different inputs or production methods were excluded from the sample.) ethylene and propylene, had more than two dozen. The sample contains relatively few observations with small numbers of input suppliers.9
In many industries forward and backward integration decisions can be regarded as symmetric (Salinger [1989] ). Nevertheless, the analysis in this study focuses solely on backward integration. This is because the nature of vertical relationships in the chemicals sector makes it difficult to test forward integration hypotheses. The difficulty arises from the data requirements of binomial logit analysis: one must be able to identify a unique market into which the firm might have integrated. For most chemical manufacturing processes the principal input is unique and easily identified, but the chemical output can be used in a variety of downstream applications. The existence of multiple downstream markets into which integration might have occurred greatly complicates any forward integration test procedure.'0
111(i). Dependent variable
The dependent variable is a zero/one dummy that records, for each downstream product and producer, whether or not that firm manufactured its primary chemical input at the end of 1980. Given the data available, two related measures of backward integration were computed: (1) plant-level integration, and (2) firm-level integration. The plant-level measure equals one if the firm produced both the primary input and the downstream product at the same geographic site. The firm-level measure equals one if the firm produced the input at any of its plant sites in the United States. The plantlevel dummy is generally the more accurate indicator of integration, given that captive inputs are usually converted at the site where they are produced. " While existence of upstream and downstream facilities under common ownership is reasonable evidence of integration, it does not imply that the direction of integration was backward. To restrict the sample to (predominantly) firms that faced backward integration decisions, oil companies were dropped from the sample. Most oil companies, given their upstream base, were pursuing forward integration. The deletion of oil producers from the sample reduced the total number of company-product observations from 276 to 203. Of the firms remaining in the sample, about 75% had their major base of operation in the chemical industry.
While the integration dummies developed here have advantages over many 9 The analysis assumes that the number of suppliers observed in 1980 is approximately the number anticipated by downstream producers when they made their integration decisions. The number of upstream firms operating in the mid-1960s and 1970s was generally smaller than the number observed in 1980, but not substantially so.
' The SRI publication, Chemical Origins and Markets, identifies the linkages between chemical process inputs and outputs.
"' In many instances where integration was shown only at the firm level, the captive input was being used to make a different doWnstream product. of the proxy measures used in prior studies, integration decisions were not as dichotomous as the use of dummy variables may suggest. In the chemical industry, non-integrated producers seldom rely on spot market transactions; most arms-length purchases take the form of contracts, which vary in duration. Prior to the 1973 oil embargo, annual, fixed-price contracts were most common; since then, contracts have tended to be longer-term and more complex. 12 Thus, the "non-integrated" firms in the sample spanned a range of contractual linkages. Moreover, some "integrated" firms produced all of their input requirements, some produced only part, and others produced a net surplus that was sold in the input market. For each product in the sample, Table I reports the percentage of producers (excluding oil companies) that were backward integrated. Of the 203 downstream producers in the sample, 39% were integrated at the plant level and 53% were integrated at the firm level. Despite the fact that theoretical models often yield outcomes in which either all producers or none are integrated (e.g. Arrow [1975] ; Green [1986] ), the Table shows that most markets in the sample had an intermediate structure, with both integrated and non-integrated firms.
111(ii). Explanatory variables
The analysis assumes that producers were observed in long-run equilibrium; firms were integrated in 1980 if integration was optimal, given characteristics of the product markets and the individual firm.
The This measure was computed by multiplying the firm's observed plant capacity in 1980 by an engineering estimate of total fixed investment per unit of capacity. 1 5 Plants will normally be idled if they are unable to obtain supplies of the primary input. However, the extent to which plant assets were actually locked-in with a specific supplier is not known. Prior studies (e.g. Bradburd [1982] ) offer evidence that supplier switching costs are often high, especially in the short run. For example, if all arms-length supplies of the input are committed to buyers through contracts, quick replacement of an existing supplier may not be possible.
A second measure of sunk costs that is more clearly transaction-specific relates to the type of transport facilities required. Most of the chemical inputs in the sample are liquids at room temperature (or after slight heating) which allows them to be pumped into railroad tank cars and transported at relatively low cost. The flexibility of railcar transport helps avoid problems of lock-in to a specific supplier. However, several upstream chemicals in the sample (ethylene, ethylene oxide, propylene, and chlorine) are gasses at room temperature. Large fixed investments in pipeline facilities are generally required to ship gasses between plants.'6 This investment is often highly 14 Given that CONC is an imperfect proxy for the ex ante small numbers condition relevant to the transactions cost model, several related measures of upstream concentration were also tested. CONC is based on the total number of producers of the upstream input in 1980, including integrated firms. Inclusion of integrated producers in the count of potential suppliers is generally appropriate, since it is common for integrated firms to produce and sell a net surplus of the upstream product. Tests of an alternate measure of concentration, based only on the number of non-integrated suppliers, gave similar results to those reported below for CONC. Another problem with CONC is that the number of input producers observed in 1980 may not be indicative of the number anticipated at the time that the firm made its backward integration decision. To reflect the level of supplier concentration prior to the entry of many of the firms in the sample, an alternate measure of CONC was computed based on the number of input suppliers observed in 1965. The results for this measure were similar to those reported in Table II below. In general, the supplier concentration results proved robust to changes in definition and time period.
15 For each product, the SRI Process Economics Program Yearbook reports an estimate of total fixed investment cost for a "typical" plant of given capacity. SUNK is based on the assumption that the required fixed investment per unit of capacity was constant over the range of plant sizes observed. Scale economies in investment are ignored, but the resulting errors are presumably small relative to variance in the magnitude of SUNK across observations in the sample. 16 Chlorine is normally liquified and shipped in special containers.
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specific to the plants that are interconnected. Thus, serious problems of lockin may arise when firms purchase gaseous inputs from independent suppliers. 1 7
The following zero/one dummy variable was used to capture this anticipated differential between gaseous and liquid inputs: GAS = 1 if the upstream input is a gas.
Ten of the downstream products in the sample are based on gaseous inputs. One would expect a higher probability of backward integration by producers of these products, other conditions equal. 18 Hypothesis H3 predicts that integration is more likely when the upstream input accounts for a large fraction of total cost. This hypothesis was tested using the measure: IMP = cost of the upstream input, as a fraction of total production cost.
For each downstream product, the chemical input selected for analysis is the one that accounted for the largest fraction of total cost. This fraction varies across the sample, from a minimum of 31% (caprolactam) to nearly 100% (ethylene glycol, propylene glycol and phenol). Hypothesis (H3) implies that the probability of integration should increase with IMP.
III(ii)b. Factors implied by the demand variability theories
According to hypothesis (H5), derived from the Carlton model, backward integration is more likely when the firm's input requirements account for a large fraction of upstream industry output. This was tested using the measure: SHARE = firm's estimated consumption of the input, as a fraction of the total quantity produced by the upstream industry.'9
The Carlton model implies that integration should be positively related to SHARE. On average, a given firm in the sample consumed about 5% of the 7 The degree of lock-in derived from pipeline investments also depends on the location of the plants. Many chemical plants are concentrated along the Texas and Louisiana Gulf Coast. In this region, pipeliwe interconnections are common, and the existence of these interconnections facilitates possible recontracting with new suppliers. Logit equations that included a separate GAS dummy for Gulf Coast plants revealed that such plants were less likely to be integrated than plants located in other regions. 18 Of the producers in the sample that used gaseous inputs, 55% were backward integrated at the plant level (65% at the firm level). Of the producers using non-gaseous inputs, 31% were integrated at the plant level (47% at the firm level). For each observation in the sample, the variability measures were derived as follows. For the upstream product, the trend rate of output growth was removed by regressing total industry output, Qit, on time and time-squared, i.e. equations are based on the firm-level measure. The results are similar for both pairs of logit equations. The CONC coefficients appear with the expected positive sign but are statistically insignificant in all but equation (3). Thus, hypothesis (HI), which predicts a tendency for firms to backward integrate into markets with few suppliers, is not strongly supported. One possibility is that the sample does not contain a sufficient number of observations with high upstream concentration to strongly reject the null hypothesis. Alternatively, concentration may reflect production scale economies, which may render backward integration unattractive unless the firm has substantial requirements for the input. Several of the prior studies cited in Section II have found evidence consistent with hypothesis (HI).
The results provide stronger support for hypothesis (H2), that firms integrate to avoid problems of lock-in that may arise from large sunk investments. GAS is positive and highly significant in all of the logit equations; SUNK is significant in all but equation (1). Thus, the probability of integration was positively related to the total plant investment cost and the potential need to invest in input pipelines.
The positive coefficients for IMP, which are highly significant, offer support for hypothesis (H3). The larger the fraction of total cost represented by the input, the higher the probability of backward integration.
Of the demand variability hypotheses, only (H4), derived from the Carlton model, receives strong statistical support. The UP VAR' coefficient is positive as predicted and highly significant. This implies that firms integrated backward when they encountered substantial variability in the input market that was uncorrelated with fluctuations in their own downstream market.
The results fail, however, to support hypothesis (H5), which is a less central prediction of the Carlton model. The SHARE coefficient is not significant in any of the equations; thus, there is no evidence that firms were more likely to integrate when they accounted for a large share of total demand for the input. The negative result may be due to insufficient variation in the data sample. Only ten firms in the sample consumed more than 20% of total US production of the input required. Alternatively, the negative result may reflect the fact that demand is correlated across firms selling in the same downstream market. If large and small firms within the same downstream market have similar fluctuations in their input demand, this will attenuate the risk pooling benefits available to small buyers of the input, and integration choices may not differ by size of firm.
The measures UP VAR" and DN VAR are also insignificant, indicating lack of support for hypotheses (H6) and (H7). UP VAR", the degree of variability in the input market that was correlated with the firm's downstream market, appears to have had no influence on integration decisions. Similarly, volatility in the firm's downstream market, as indicated by DNVAR, appears to have had little influence on integration decisions. The lack of significance for these two measures contrasts with the strong effect shown for UPVAR'. Firms appear to have integrated backward in response to volatility in the input market only when it arose from sources independent of their own downstream demand.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The results of this study indicate that both transactions costs and demand variability can create incentives for vertical integration. In terms of the seven hypotheses developed in Section II, the empirical tests strongly support hypotheses (H2), (H3) and (H4).
With respect to transactions costs, the results imply that firms integrated to avoid bargaining problems arising from ex post lock-in. The likelihood of integration increased with asset specificity, measured as the investment cost of plant and the potential need for inter-plant pipelines. These findings on sunk costs are consistent with prior empirical studies.
With respect to demand variability incentives, the results offer support for the Carlton [1979] model, but not for any of the other models considered. Firms appear to have integrated backward to avoid variability in the input market that was independent of fluctuations in their downstream market. This is consistent with the main prediction of the Carlton model, although not with Perry [1984] . The analysis fails to confirm Harrigan's [1983] hypothesis that backward integration is discouraged by volatility in downstream demand.20 Similarly, there is no support for the Blair and Kaserman [1983] risk aversion motive for avoidance of integration.
While the results suggest support for the Carlton model, the question remains as to why firms integrate rather than enter into long-term contracts for the input. Such contracts are not distinguished from vertical integration in Carlton's model; either alternative provides a solution to the costs associated with demand variability. Thus, some reference to the transactions cost approach is necessary to predict which alternative is likely to be most viable. Firms will opt for integration if it is difficult to write contracts that adequately cover future contingencies. In this context it is interesting that integration was stimulated only by those fluctuations in the input market that were independent of the firm's own downstream demand. This suggests that it is difficult to specify contracts that fully account for contingencies related to the demands of other buyers; whereas contingencies associated with the buyer's own demand are easier to incorporate, (e.g. through minimum and maximum quantity guarantees, price schedules, and the like). Moreover, given the limited duration of most chemical supply contracts and the need for periodic renegotiation of terms, buyers with relatively stable input requirements may be reluctant to enter into supply agreements given the likelihood that renegotiation will be necessary during periods when other buyers are facing peak demand.
An additional finding, consistent with both the transactions cost model and the Carlton model, is that firms tended to integrate when the input accounted for a large fraction of total cost. Both models imply that a price premium may be charged by input suppliers; the premium will be greater in absolute terms when the input is a substantial cost component. This in turn justifies greater investment in fixed plant facilities for production of the input, even if independent suppliers enjoy lower unit investment costs (e.g. due to economies of scale). Moreover, if management is risk averse to paying large sums for inputs under conditions of supplier "hold up" or peak demand, integration may appear attractive even if the firm suffers from high variable cost as an input producer.
While the results of this study are generally consistent with the transactions 20Harrigan considered volatility as a broader concept than the simple output variability measure tested here. Conceivably, the hypothesis may hold up more strongly with respect to other types of volatility (e.g. technological uncertainty) or in other industry environments.
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cost and Carlton models, many caveats apply. Two of the hypotheses implied by these models fail to receive empirical support. This is probably due to limitations of the data sample, but it could indicate that the other, more supportive findings are spurious, particularly in the case of the Carlton model which has not been verified in prior empirical work. The explanatory variables are imperfect measures, and omitted variables may bias the results. It is also possible that findings are specific to the chemical processing sector, and care should be taken in generalizing the results.
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